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State-led Technological Development: A Case of China’s Nanotechnology Development  
 
Abstract: 
We analyze the nanotechnology patent applications filed in China from 1998 to 2008 and find 
that the extraordinary nanotechnology development in China has been primarily promoted by the 
public sector but not driven by industry and market force. This finding implies that developing 
countries such as China with public research capacity and commitment to technological 
development can make rapid progress in basic research of emerging technologies, but it remains 
uncertain whether and when local industry can benefit from public R&D investment to actively 
develop indigenous innovation. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As Noisi and Reid (2007) argued, large developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India 
with strong public research and development (R&D) sectors should be able to catch up and 
provide global leadership in emerging technologies such as biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
Indeed, after launching its national strategy to promote nanotechnology development in 
2001(Ministry of Science and Technology, 2001), China has devoted an increasing amount of 
R&D investment from government and industry to the field, produced a soaring number of 
scientific publications, expanded its postgraduate programs in related subjects, and established 
several new specialized institutions such as the National Center for Nanoscience and Technology 
in Beijing and the National Engineering Research Center for Nanotechnology in Shanghai. China 
finds itself increasingly well positioned to become a world leader in the field. However, it seems 
to be a long way from where China is now to such world leadership. Shapira and Wang (2009) 
interviewed Chinese nanotechnology policymakers, researchers, and business representatives and 
concluded that China’s performance in nanotechnology patenting and product development is 
weak in comparison with its strength in research, indicating a significant gap between the 
research base and industrial development. 
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This article contributes to the literature that examines how developing countries can catch up in 
emerging technologies and analyzes the role governments can play in the catching-up process. 
Unlike many extant studies based on qualitative analyses, we performed rigorous quantitative 
analyses to assess the successes and difficulties of nanotechnology development in China. We 
searched and identified 30,863 nanotechnology patent applications in a comprehensive database, 
the China Patent Abstract Database, which includes over four million patent applications 
submitted to the Chinese Intellectual Property Office during the period of 1985–2009. We 
subsequently tested two competing hypotheses: (H1) Nanotechnology innovation in China is 
promoted primarily by the state and R&D activities are concentrated in public universities and 
research institutions; and (H2) Nanotechnology innovation in China has been responsive to 
market demand and produced by indigenous companies. By estimating a patent production 
function using data aggregated at the provincial level, we found consistent evidence to support 
the first hypothesis. 
 
These results reveal that, contrary to what has happened in other developed economies, 
nanotechnology development in China has been dominated by R&D activities in universities and 
research institutions. China has yet to play a major role in the commercialization and application 
of nanotechnology, as its indigenous companies have not actively engaged in technological 
innovation and industrial development. Large developing countries such as China, with strong 
public research capacity and a tradition of committing to long-term technological development, 
can achieve rapid progress in research related to emerging technologies. The question remains, 
however, whether and when indigenous industries in those countries can benefit from 
government-led technological development plans to achieve competitiveness in the global arena. 
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From here on the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on opportunities 
available to newcomers in technological catching-up and the role of government in promoting 
technological development. Section 3 examines the key strategy that the Chinese government 
adopted in the last decade to promote nanotechnology development and the progress that the 
country has achieved so far. Section 4 analyzes nanotechnology patent applications submitted to 
the Chinese Intellectual Property Office to test our hypothetical dilemma regarding whether 
nanotechnology development in China is promoted primarily by the public sector or by industry. 
Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The role of governments in technological catching-up and reflection on nanotechnology 
development in China 
Perez and Soete (1988) identified four entry barriers that latecomers must overcome if they are to 
catch up in a given industry: minimal fixed investment, scientific and technological knowledge, 
relevant skills and experience, and location advantages. Location advantages are positive 
externalities inherent to an environment in which latecomers plan to operate. Such advantages 
might involve proximity to equipment suppliers, sound transportation infrastructure, local 
availability of competent design as well as construction and engineering contractors, all of which 
can reduce the cost of production at a given location. Perez and Soete contended that entry 
barriers are lower in the new product introduction phase because any disadvantage developing 
economies might face regarding fixed investment and relevant skills and experience should be 
less challenging. They concluded that the best opportunity available to developing countries for 
catching-up lies in the new product introduction phase, especially if such countries can 
accumulate scientific and technological knowledge and location advantages relatively quickly. 
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The Chinese government’s large investment in nanotechnology R&D and the correspondingly 
rapid growth in nanotechnology publications and patents suggest that China is overcoming the 
scientific and technological knowledge barrier. It may take quite a long time, however, for such 
public investment to pay off given the uncertainty of nanotechnology. Without funding, however, 
obsolescence is virtually guaranteed. After the US, Europe, Japan, and many other national and 
regional governments launched nanotechnology development strategies in the late 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s, Chinese policymakers felt that the country should jump on the 
bandwagon to avoid being left behind in exploring this emerging technology. It was thought by 
them that an earlier and firmer commitment to the technology would increase the likelihood that 
indigenous industry would be able to compete effectively when the technology matures. 
 
Governments play an indispensable role in technological catching-up in East Asia by establishing  
public research institutions and universities and sponsoring the research carried out there. 
According to Lee (2000), the South Korean government established a series of government-
funded research institutes in the 1960s and 1970s. The government did not demand an immediate 
return from these public research institutes, instead granting them full autonomy in allocating 
their operational funds. In addition to conducting contract research for industry and training R&D 
personnel, governmental research institutions attracted overseas scientists, many of whom played 
key roles in developing heavy and high-tech industries from the 1970s onward. Moreover, the 
existence of such public institutions enhanced the social status of scientists and engineers, 
attracting the best Korean students to study science and engineering. 
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East Asian governments also promoted public and private R&D consortia, which proved 
instrumental in absorbing and assimilating foreign technologies. Such R&D consortia reduced 
technological uncertainty by offering up-to-date information on technology trends and identifying 
appropriate targets for R&D projects (Lee and Lim, 2001; Lee et al., 2005). The governments 
also adopted measures to provide market protection, export subsidies, and government 
procurement practices favorable to domestic firms (Fransman, 1986; Sung and Carlsson, 2003). 
They even bargained with multinational enterprises over technological transfer and imposed 
domestic content requirements on foreign direct investment (Mu and Lee, 2005; Fan, 2006). 
 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argued in favor of a development strategy that incorporates private 
initiatives in a public action framework and encourages greater restructuring, diversification, and 
technological dynamism than market forces on their own would generate. Promoting such a “self-
discovery” process, through which entrepreneurs could learn what they are good at producing at 
low cost, requires government support of entrepreneurship and investment in new activities ex 
ante while pushing out unproductive firms and sectors ex post. Hausmann and Rodrik 
demonstrated that laissez-faire policy would lead to under-provision of innovation while state 
planning and public investment can drive economic development. Similar to its counterpart 
governments in other East Asian countries, which played an instrumental role in the technological 
catching-up process, the Chinese government acted as the country’s largest source of R&D 
funding for nanotechnology development. Public investment was transformed into advanced 
infrastructure, equipment, instruments, and up-to-date technological standards. Government- 
funded research projects and positions attracted scientists and engineers, particularly young 
researchers, and retained them. Due to the government’s unprecedented efforts, China has 
emerged as a major global player in the field. In the next section, we summarize the progress of 
nanotechnology R&D in China over the last decade. 
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3. Progress of nanotechnology R&D in China 
As Bai (2001, 2005) observed, when nanotechnology R&D techniques were introduced to China 
from abroad in the 1980s, they were well received by Chinese scientists. The Chinese Academy 
of Sciences, the National Natural Science Foundation and the State Science and Technology 
Commission (the predecessor of the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology) started to fund 
related research. In the 1990s, several important academic conferences held in China, such as the 
7th International Conference on Scanning Tunneling Microscopy (1993) and the 4th International 
Conference on Nanometer-Scale Science and Technology (1996), showcased Chinese scientists’ 
early participation in the field. From 1990 to 2002, nearly 1,000 projects were funded by the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (or the State Science and Technology Commission). Over 
the same period, the National Natural Science Foundation of China approved another 1,000 
small-scale grants for projects related to nanotechnology. In short, the initiation of 
nanotechnology R&D in China can be dated back to the 1980s and 1990s. Intensive R&D 
activities did not begin, however, until the early 2000s. 
 
In November 2000, the National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology was 
established to oversee national policies and coordinate action. The head of the Ministry of 
Science and Technology was the director of the committee. Vice directors included vice ministers 
in that ministry, the vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the vice president of 
the National Natural Science Foundation. Officials from the Ministry of Education, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (a ministerial agency), and the Commission on Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense were also involved as members of the committee. 
The National Steering Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology involved all the R&D 
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funding organizations in the country, making concerted policy action at the national level possible. 
The committee drafted the first Chinese national policy document intended to promote 
nanotechnology development, which was announced as the National Nanotechnology 
Development Strategy (2001–2010) and was reminiscent of similar strategies or initiatives 
announced in other countries, such as the National Nanotechnology Initiative in the US. 
 
The National Nanotechnology Development Strategy (2001–2010)—hereafter “the Strategy”— 
emphasized the importance of basic science and called for strengthened financial support from 
the government. It prioritized commercializing nanotechnology and appropriating intellectual 
property from R&D activities. The Strategy argues that successful nanotechnology development 
depends on competent R&D personnel and highlights the need for training and retaining scientists 
in the field, which evinces a long-term view of policymaking. The Strategy mapped out a 
blueprint for Chinese nanotechnology development over the course of the following decade. 
 
With guidance from the Strategy and early engagement in R&D, China’s global rise in 
nanotechnology has been phenomenal. In 1998, there were merely 1,875 nanotechnology-related 
scientific publications out of China, compared with 9,468 from the US and 4,423 from Japan.i In 
2008, Chinese nanotechnology publications outnumbered those from Japan by a wide margin, 
positioning China in second place in the world in number of publications, trailing only the US. 
China’s share in the world’s nanotechnology publications was only 6 percent in 1998. By 2008, 
however, China accounted for 23 percent. Figure 1 lists the number of nanotechnology 
publications produced by the world’s 10 most-prolific countries from 1998 through 2008. A 
calculation of the average annual growth rate in the number of articles by the 10 most-prolific 
countries reveals rapid growth in China, South Korea, and India. China’s average annual growth 
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rate of 92 percent each year between 1998 and 2008 is nothing short of extraordinary. In contrast, 
the other countries in the top 10, including the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and 
Russia, achieved only 8 to 15 percent rates in annual growth. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
China’s progress is less impressive in patenting than in publishing. Using the PATSTAT database 
to count worldwide patent applications from 1929 through 2009 that fall under the European 
Patent Office’s nanotechnology classification Y01N, we find that the 1,018 applications 
submitted by Chinese inventors or applicants accounted for only 0.88 percent of the world’s total, 
in comparison with the US share of 34.2 percent and the Japanese share of 19.7 percent. ii 
Although China’s share is very small, the number of patents filed by Chinese applicants grew 
rapidly, at an average rate of 36.8 percent per year, from 1998 through 2007 (Figure 2). Excepting 
South Korea, where the rate grew at an extraordinary 77.7 percent annually, applications in the 
rest of the top 10 countries increased more slowly than in China. Some leading countries, such as 
Japan and France, have seen negative rates of growth in nanotechnology patents. Nanotechnology 
patent applications filed with the Chinese Intellectual Property Office also grew rapidly during 
the same period. In 1998 there were merely 195 applications but the number increased to 4,491 in 
2008. 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
According to Lux Research (2008), the US and Japanese governments invested US$1,816 million 
and US$1,060 million (by purchasing power parity or PPP), respectively, on nanotechnology 
R&D during 2005–2007. The Chinese government invested US$PPP893 million during the same 
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period, which positions China in third place in the worldwide ranking (Figure 3). However, 
corporate funding in China amounted to only US$PPP348 million, which was only slightly more 
than one-third of government funding. Ranked by corporate funding, China was ranked fifth in 
the world after the US (US$PPP2,362 million), Japan (US$PPP2,038 million), Germany, and 
South Korea. A European Commission (2005) estimation showed that the Chinese government 
invested 83 million euros in 2004 on nanotechnology R&D, in comparison with the US 
government’s 1.2 billion euros and the Japanese government’s 750 million euros. China was thus 
ranked after the US, Japan, Germany, France, South Korea, and the UK in public investment in 
nanotechnology R&D in 2004. 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
 
Indicators of scientific publications, patent applications, and public and corporate funding all 
reveal that China has been closing the gap with the leading countries in this emerging field in the 
past decade and is becoming a major player in the world.iii This is attributed to the early launch of 
the Strategy and China’s firm commitment to public funding of nanotechnology R&D. However, 
the literature suggests that although a lot of new technologies such as Internet emerged out of 
government-funded R&D projects, large-scale commercialization of those technologies depend 
on a variety of other factors in addition to public investment. The forerunner of the Internet, the 
ARPANET, was built up under the sponsorship of the US Department of Defense in the late 
1960s. The US Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation’s funding of 
computer science research and networking constituted the bulk of Internet-related R&D funding 
during the early period of technological development. Nevertheless, public investment alone 
cannot explain the US’s lead in developing critical innovations and early adoption of new 
applications of the Internet. The neutrality of US public R&D programs regarding specific 
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commercial applications, the diversity of the federal R&D portfolio, antitrust and 
telecommunications policy, the venture capital industry, an open intellectual property rights 
regime, and pro-patent legislation in the late 1980s and 1990s have all contributed to the US’s 
success (Mowery and Simcoe, 2002). 
 
The ultimate goal of any development or technology strategy is to nurture industrial activities and 
foster business growth. The question remains whether indigenous Chinese industry has emerged 
robustly or picked up the momentum in nanotechnology R&D and industrial development. We 
argue that this is an important criterion for assessing the effectiveness of the Strategy. We 
therefore endeavored to investigate the emergence of nanotechnology development on the part of 
indigenous Chinese industry in light of an important fact: public investment is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for successful development and commercialization of emerging technologies. 
In the following section, we use patent applications as indicators to represent technological 
innovations and test the two abovementioned hypotheses: (H1) Nanotechnology innovation in 
China is promoted primarily by the state and R&D activities are concentrated in public 
universities and research institutions; and (H2) Nanotechnology innovation in China has been 
responsive to market demand and produced by indigenous companies.  
 
4. Drivers of nanotechnology patenting in China  
4.1 Data 
We collected information on nanotechnology patent applications filed in China from the China 
Patent Abstract Database. The database includes over four million patent applications submitted 
by domestic and foreign applicants to the Chinese Intellectual Property Office during the period 
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of 1985–2009. The information provided in the database on each patent includes patent 
application and publication number, application and publication date, patent number, title, 
International Patent Classification (IPC) class, abstract, claims, legal status, and so on. We used 
the same search strategy (Porter et al., 2008), which is applied to identify the worldwide 
nanotechnology publications, to find 30,863 nanotechnology patent applications in the Database. 
These applications have been filed by both domestic and foreign applicants. We were able to 
classify these applications according to applicants’ origins at the country and provincial levels. 
 
Statistics on these 30,863 nanotechnology patent applications shows that, although the first filing 
was in 1991, little momentum in nanotechnology patenting in China was built until 2001. The 
number of applications jumped from 526 in 2000 to 2,041 in 2001. In 2008 alone, 4,491 
nanotechnology patent applications were submitted. Of these 30,863 patents, 93 percent are for 
inventions.iv We observed two salient characteristics of nanotechnology patent applications in 
China. First, domestic organizations applied for proportionally more invention patents in 
nanotechnology than in other fields. Seventeen percent of the 30,863 patents were filed by foreign 
organizations while 83 percent were submitted by domestic organizations. Although the share in 
overall invention patent applications filed by domestic organizations increased steadily over the 
observation period of 1998–2008, by comparison only 67 percent of all invention patent 
applications in China were filed by domestic organizations in 2008. Second, universities and 
public research institutions dominated China’s nanotechnology patent applications. As seen in 
Table 1, 56 percent of domestic nanotechnology patent applications were filed by such 
organizations. Industry accounted for only approximately 18 percent of domestic nanotechnology 
patent applications.v In comparison, the share in domestic overall invention patent applications 
filed by industry was 49 percent in 2008, which had increased from 18 percent in 1998. 
University-industry and research institution–industry co-applications exist, but they account for 
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only about 3 percent of the total. In contrast, among applications filed by foreign organizations, 
84 percent were filed by industry. 
(Here Insert Table 1) 
 
We used the OECD Technology Concordance (Johnson, 2002) to classify all nanotechnology 
patent applications into the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) system. As seen 
in Figure 4, 43 percent of the applications were in the chemicals and chemical products sector and 
19 percent were in the machinery and equipment sector. Three other sectors that account for more 
than one percent of all applications are radio, television, and communication equipment; precision 
and optical instruments and watches; and furniture and manufacturing not elsewhere included. 
 (Here insert Figure 4) 
 
4.2 Model  
In this section, we present our investigation of drivers of nanotechnology patenting in China by 
estimating a patent production model. The dependent variable is the count number of 
nanotechnology patent applications aggregated at the provincial level. We aggregated the data at 
the provincial level because the data pertaining to the key explanatory variables are harvested 
from various statistics yearbooks and are available only at the provincial level. Data on the 
dependent variable are all zero or positive integers, which indicates that a count data model is 
appropriate. We have data covering 30 provinces and a time span of 11 years (1998–2008). 
Simply pooling the data together in estimation would not have allowed us to control for 
unobservable heterogeneity. Therefore, we chose to proceed with fixed- and random-effects 
models. Because only 9.7 percent of the data are zero, we did not adopt the widely used Zero 
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Inflated Poisson model to control for the possible impact of the zero value. In other words, we did 
not model the difference between provinces that were not engaged in nanotechnology innovation 
and others that were engaged in innovation but failed to apply for patents. 
 
After excluding the Zero Inflated Poisson model, we were left with fixed- and random-effects 
Poisson and Negative Binomial models. The Poisson estimator’s efficiency relies on the 
assumption that the conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance (equidispersion), which 
is usually violated in practical applications, including in our case. With the over-dispersion of our 
data, the Poisson estimator would result in under-estimated standard errors and, accordingly, 
inflated statistical significance. The Negative Binomial model does not depend on the 
equidispersion assumption and thus is more flexible than the Poisson model for modeling over-
dispersion. However, the maximum likelihood estimation of the Negative Binomial model is not 
consistent if there is any distributional misspecification. Wooldridge (1999) showed that, as long 
as the conditional mean is correctly specified, the fixed-effects Poisson estimator is consistent and 
a robust variance matrix for the estimator is obtainable.vi In this sense, the Poisson estimator is 
more robust than the Negative Binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, 2009). The robust 
standard errors of the Poisson model can also be obtained through the bootstrap method 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). With robust standard errors, the assumption of equidispersion 
required with the Poisson model is relaxed. Bearing all these considerations in mind, we report 
the results of the Poisson model with robust standard errors together with those of the Negative 
Binomial model.vii 
 
The random-effects model assumes that the random effects (individual specific unobservables) 
are uncorrelated with regressors (individual specific observables). We have sufficient reason to 
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suspect this assumption in our case. For example, the quantity of patent applications is affected 
by the quality of the R&D personnel in the provinces, which is not measured by the regressors 
(we are able to measure only the quantity of the R&D personnel) and is accordingly included in 
the random effects. However, these random effects (e.g., the quality of R&D personnel) would be 
correlated with the number of scientific publications produced in the provinces, which is one of 
the regressors. If the assumption is violated as such, the random-effects estimator is not consistent. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to reject the random-effects Negative Binomial model with a 
Hausman test because the chi-square statistic is negative, which means that the model does not 
meet the asymptotic assumptions of the test. We were not able to perform the Hausman test on 
the Poission model either, because we used the bootstrap method to obtain the robust standard 
errors. We thus report the results of both the fixed-effects and random-effects models for the 
baseline model, but we focus on explaining the former. Regarding the results of the robustness 
check, we report only those of the fixed-effects models. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the results of the fixed-effects and random-effects model are not materially different. 
 
4.3  Independent variables 
To test the hypothesis H1, that China’s nanotechnology development is promoted primarily by 
public universities and research institutions, we used scientific publications in the Web of Science 
database to measure research activities in Chinese universities and public research institutions. 
We were able to identify 112,524 nanotechnology publications authored by the Chinese 
organizations during the 1998–2008 period. We cleaned the addresses of the Chinese universities 
and institutions and assigned each publication to the respective provinces. Among these 
publications, we determined that only two percent (i.e., 2,396 articles) are published by industry 
or co-published by industry and university or public research institutions. The rest are written 
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solely by researchers in universities and research institutions. Therefore, we were able to consider 
the number of Web of Science publications as a precise measurement of research activities on the 
part of universities and research institutions in each province. 
 
We constructed three variables to measure growth in the technology market, foreign direct 
investment, and high-technology industry in the provinces to test hypothesis H2, that China’s 
nanotechnology development has been responsive to market demand and dominated by the 
activities of indigenous companies. 
 
China promulgated the law of technology transfer in 1985. The law stipulates that technology 
transactions are exempt from any value-added tax as long as the contracts are verified by 
provincial bureaus of science and technology. Approved contracts are registered in the so-called 
technology market in provincial governments. They can be classified into contracts for 
commissioned technology development, technology transfer, consultancy, and service.  
According to Ministry of Science and Technology (2008) statistics, the registered transaction 
value of technology transfer contracts in China increased sixfold, from RMB43.6 billion in 1998 
to RMB266.5 billion in 2008. The average annual growth rate of the transaction value over the 
period was nearly 20 percent. In 2008, the value of patent licensing contracts accounted for 9 
percent of the total registered transaction value. Industry is the dominant player in the technology 
market. As technology transferor and recipient industry accounted, respectively, for 88 and 81 
percent of total transaction value. We considered the transaction value of technology transfer 
contracts involving organizations in provinces as recipients as a proxy for demand for technology 
in a given province. 
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China has been the most popular foreign direct investment (FDI) destination among developing 
countries over the past three decades. After opening up its economy, China received US$852.6 
billion FDI from 1979 to 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). In 2008 alone, China drew 
US$108.3 billion of FDI inflow and was ranked second in the world in terms of volume of inflow 
after the US (UNCTAD, 2010). Hu and Jefferson (2009) studied the patenting activities of large 
and medium Chinese enterprises and found that China’s integration into the world economy, 
manifested by the vast inflow of FDI, has expanded the technological opportunity for domestic 
firms to innovate and imitate. Hu and Jefferson showed that a 10-percent increase in the foreign 
share of industry value added results in an increase in patent applications on the part of both large 
and medium Chinese firms of approximately 15 percent. Hu (2010) argued that, as domestic firms’ 
ability to imitate foreign technology gains strength and competition between foreign firms 
intensifies in the Chinese market, competitive threat forces foreign firms to file more patent 
applications in China. However, the positive impact of FDI on patenting activities in China was 
not confirmed by Yueh (2009). In her estimation of the patent production function at the 
provincial level, an exercise that is similar to ours, FDI is not a significant determinant of the 
patenting tendency of a province, even in the coastal region, which receives the majority of FDI 
inflow to China. For this study we used the accumulated FDI in each province as a proxy for 
foreign firms’ activities. We wanted to investigate whether the continuous presence of foreign 
firms in the provinces would intensify their competition with domestic firms as well as 
competition between domestic firms—in which case the latter would file more nanotechnology 
patents—or alternatively whether foreign firms have sourced nanotechnology innovation from 
Chinese universities and research institutions and thus created market demand for 
nanotechnology R&D. 
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Nanotechnology has wide application in a broad spectrum of industries, particularly in 
pharmaceuticals, aircraft and aerospace, information and telecommunications, and medical 
equipment and measuring instruments, which are so-called high-technology sectors. Figure 4 
demonstrates that nanotechnology patent applications in China are concentrated in these 
industries. Firms in high-tech industries spend proportionally more of their resources on R&D 
than do their counterparts in other industries. High-tech sectors in China developed rapidly over 
the past two decades. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2009), high-tech industry 
revenue in China increased fivefold, from RMB1041.1 billion in 2000 to RMB5708.7 billion in 
2008. Firms in these sectors employed 3.9 million employees in 2000, but, by 2008, they 
employed 9.45 million. We suspect that the rapid expansion of Chinese high-tech sectors has 
generated strong demand for nanotechnology development. To gauge the impact of this 
expansion, we include in the regression a variable representing high-tech sector revenues. 
4.4 Control variables 
There are two types of inputs regarding patent production: R&D investment and personnel. 
Because there are no consistent data available indicating R&D investment during the observation 
period, we had to rely on number of scientists and engineers working in natural science fields in 
universities and research institutions and scientists and engineers in large or medium enterprises 
as proxies for input into the patent production process. 
 
China’s patent law was promulgated in 1985 and amended in 1992, 2000 and 2008. The 2000 
amendment was designed to harmonize China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) standards with 
international rules, as China anticipated signing, in 2001, the Agreement of Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights as part of its World Trade Organization (WTO) 
obligations. The 2008 amendment aimed to enhance patent quality and better protect national 
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security and state interests. Since the patent law came into effect in 1985, the IPR protection 
environment in China had gradually improved, particularly after China joined the WTO in 2001. 
Following this, the number of patent applications in China increased rapidly, from 121,989 in 
1998 to 828,328 in 2008. Among invention patent applications, the share of domestic applicants 
grew from 38 percent in 1998 to 67 percent in 2008. To control for the impact of improvements 
in the Chinese IPR system regarding nanotechnology patenting, we added number of invention 
patents of each province as a control variable. 
4.5 Results 
As seen in Table 2, the coefficients of number of Web of Science nanotechnology publications 
are highly significant in both the Negative Binomial and the Poisson model. In contrast, the 
coefficients of transaction value of technology transfer contracts involving organizations in a 
province as recipients are not statistically significant in either the Negative Binomial or the 
Poisson models. The coefficients of accumulated FDI are negative and significant. The 
coefficients of revenue in high-tech sectors are positive and significant in the Poisson model but 
not statistically significant in the Negative Binomial model. 
 
Although the finding with regard to revenue in high-tech industries is inconclusive, the result 
provides evidence that nanotechnology patenting in China is highly correlated with academic 
research undertaken in university and public research institutions, but only weakly linked to 
technology demand, foreign direct investment, or the development of high-tech industries in the 
country. In other words, nanotechnology development in China is primarily driven by R&D 
activities carried out in the public sector, instead of by industry in response to market demand. 
The negative sign of the coefficient of FDI stock occurs because provinces with relatively greater 
FDI stocks do not exhibit more patents in nanotechnology. For example, Beijing is ranked 9th by 
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FDI stock among the 30 provinces, but is home to the most patents. Shanghai and Guangdong are 
ranked 2nd and 3rd by number of patent applications. However, the number of patent applications 
from Shanghai is twice of that of Guangdong even though Guangdong’s FDI stock is almost 
twice that of Shanghai. 
 
The coefficients of R&D human resources input in universities and large or medium enterprises 
are not statistically significant in most specifications. Surprisingly, the coefficient of number of 
scientists and engineers in research institutions is negative and significant across the models. This 
might be because of the transformation and consolidation of Chinese research institutions that 
took place after 1998. Many research institutions affiliated with ministries were transformed into 
for-profit enterprises, non-profit or intermediary organizations, or merged into universities 
(Huang et al, 2004). The number of public research institutions declined rapidly from 1999 to 
2005. In 2001, research institutions employed 620 thousand people, while in 2005 they employed 
only 560 thousand (OECD, 2008). Our data also reflect this change, as in most provinces the 
number of scientists and engineers engaged in scientific and technological activities (natural 
science fields) decreased after 1998 and resumed growing only in 2007 and 2008. Because of its 
declining value, the coefficient of the variable is negative in the regression. 
4.6 Robustness check 
Although we could not find consistent data reflecting R&D investment in research institutions or 
in large or medium enterprises, we were able to find consistent data on university R&D 
expenditure during the observation period. We therefore replaced number of scientists and 
engineers with data on university R&D expenditure in the robust analysis. We also substituted 
number of scientists and engineers from large or medium enterprises with number of patent 
applications from large or medium enterprises, because the latter can also be used to measure the 
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intensity of innovation activities in industry. Alternatively, we could have used gross R&D 
expenditure in each province in the patent production function instead of measuring R&D input 
from universities, research institutions, and industry separately. Through this specification, we 
were able to reduce the possible impact of multicollinearity between the key independent 
variables and control variables. We also substituted the transaction value of technology transfer 
contracts involving organizations in provinces as recipients and transferors with the variable 
considering only organizations as recipients. We then were able to control for cases in which 
universities and research institutions in one province license a high volume of patents to 
companies in another province, which would otherwise not be counted in the baseline model. 
None of the abovementioned robust analyses renders materially different results compared with 
those of the baseline model (see Table 3). In particular, the coefficients of revenue in high-tech 
sectors are either not significant or are negative and significant in robustness check results. The 
results of the random-effects Negative Binomial and Poisson models are similar to those of the 
fixed-effects models and are available upon request from the authors. 
(Here insert Table 3) 
 
5. Discussion 
The econometric analysis supports the first hypothesis, namely that nanotechnology patenting in 
China is highly correlated with academic research undertaken in university and public research 
institutions, but weakly linked to technology demand, foreign direct investment, and the 
development of high-tech industries in the country. This confirms the observation that China has 
successfully boosted basic nanotechnology research, but has not yet performed extraordinarily 
well regarding industrial development. 
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Chinese industrial R&D in nanotechnology has remained weak. Corporate funding in China was 
at a level that was only 40 percent of the level of government funding during the period of 2005–
2007 (Figure 3). In contrast, industry in general accounted for 72.3 percent of total Chinese R&D 
expenditure in 2007 (Ministry of Science and Technology, 2009). Differing from what has 
occurred in China, corporate funding by American and Japanese enterprises has far surpassed 
government funding, arguably because firms from these two countries have acquired or 
developed advanced technological capabilities that allow them to appropriate sufficient return on 
R&D investment. Bai (2005) estimated that only about 300 firms in China engaged in business 
activities related to nanotechnology in 2005. The majority of indigenous Chinese firms have not 
established a high level of international competitiveness based on technological advancement, 
innovation, or R&D. It has been easier for them to purchase advanced production lines or 
blueprints from domestic or foreign suppliers and leverage their low-cost manufacturing 
capability to compete domestically or internationally. Seeking to transfer cutting-edge 
technologies from universities and research institutions is costly and risky. There thus are not 
enough incentives on the demand side for Chinese firms to engage in nanotechnology R&D. 
 
In addition, among domestically generated nanotechnology patent applications in China, 56 
percent were filed by universities and research institutes. Only 18 percent were applied for by 
industry representatives (Table 1), whereas in other industrialized countries industry is the main 
performer of industrial development and the leading source of patent applications. For example, 
US universities and research organizations were granted over 1,000 nanotechnology patents in the 
period of 1990–2006, while industry produced about 5,000 patents during the same period 
(Shapira and Wang, 2009). Most indigenous Chinese companies have lacked sufficiently robust 
technological capabilities with which to fully assess prototype technology developed in public 
research institutions and universities. Such organizations were established to profit from their 
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core technologies and have no long-term research agenda. In addition to seeking a modest amount 
of technological advice and using some university-owned equipment and facilities, these 
companies did not interact to a significant extent with universities or research institutions. 
 
Based on data collected from interviews with nanotechnology scientists and company 
representatives, Shapira and Wang argued that scholars in the Chinese Academy of Science as 
well as those from universities were incentivized to apply for patents because patent applications 
as well as publications were important elements in career development and promotion, and also 
for meeting the deliverable targets of their government-funded research projects. Many of these 
patents are never used after being granted. In a survey jointly undertaken by the Chinese 
Intellectual Property Rights Office and the Ministry of Education in 2005, canvassing the top 100 
Chinese universities in patenting activities, 24 among the 50 universities responding to the survey 
indicated that researchers have no interest in using or licensing patents because their primary 
objective is to attain patents instead of using them to appropriate return on R&D investments (Liu, 
et al. 2007). The survey also revealed that the monetary compensation scientists receive for patent 
grants in the 50 universities is greater than the compensation they receive for scientific 
publications. 
 
It is perhaps tempting to think that indigenous Chinese firms have not yet patented more actively 
because it can take more than a decade to benefit from intensive public R&D investment. We 
argue that this is not the case. The US and China started at almost the same time to invest heavily 
in public funding of nanotechnology development. As noted above, US firms were granted five 
times more patents than US universities and research institutions were from 1990 to 2006. 
However, Chinese firms accounted for only 18 percent of all nanotechnology patent applications 
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during the period of 1998–2008. Weak R&D capabilities and tenuous connections with university 
and research institutions is the culprit behind the sluggish patenting performance of indigenous 
industry in China. One might interpret the high correlation between publications and patent 
applications as characteristic of a close relationship between basic and applied research in 
nanotechnology in China. Such an interpretation would be valid, however, only if the majority of 
Chinese nanotechnology patents were produced by industry, which is not true. We argue that the 
high correlation between the production of publications and patents at the provincial level is 
because that not only the majority of publications but also over 50 percent of all patents are 
generated by universities and research institutions. 
 
Darby and Zucker (2003, 2005) found that U.S. firms become involved in nanotechnology 
wherever and whenever scientists publish breakthrough academic articles. They argued that the 
commercialization of nanotechnology depends on the occurrence of scientific research and 
discoveries in the same US regions. In contrast to the situation in the US, academic research and 
industrial development and production in China are performed in disparate locations with only 
loose links connecting them. As seen in Table 4, Beijing, the capital city in the north, hosted 22 
percent of the departments or institutions that published more than 50 nanotechnology Web of 
Science publications and filed 21 percent of the country’s patent applications. However, Beijing 
hosted only 6 percent of the listed companies that engage in business activities related to 
nanotechnology.viii Controlling for the share in general listed companies from Beijing in China’s 
total listed companies (8 percent), we confirm that 6 percent is actually smaller than what would 
be expected if nanotechnology-related business activities were distributed equally across the 
country. Beijing is a center of academic research and patenting activities, but not a hotspot of 
industrial development and production. 
25 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Guangdong in Southern China is, by contrast, home to merely 2 percent of departments or 
institutions that have published more than 50 nanotechnology articles or applied for 8 percent of 
patents, but it hosted 12 percent of the listed companies engaging in nanotechnology-related 
business. By no means is Guangdong an academic research center, but it is an important location 
for industrial applications. Much like Guangdong, Zhejiang accounted for a small share in basic 
research and patent applications, but concentrated a significant share in industrial activities. 
Beijing, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai, plus Tianjin, are the six most highly 
developed provinces in China in terms of GDP per capita and all are known for having sound 
infrastructure, an open business environment, abundant financial resources, and a concentration 
of human resources. There is no other reason to explain the conspicuous differences in their 
respective performances in nanotechnology R&D and related business activities other than that 
basic research, technology development, and industrial production of nanotechnology in China 
are carried out separately. An increasing proportion of public funding has been poured into 
universities and research institutions affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which are 
largely concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai (Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong alone produced 
almost half of all Chinese nanotechnology publications). Such public R&D investment has 
resulted in a boom in scientific publications and patent applications in some locations. However, 
the commercialization of technology has been weak, and industrial development and production 
have remained detached from the scientific research system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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China has made tremendous progress in nanotechnology development since the National 
Nanotechnology Development Strategy was enacted in 2001. Intensive public investment in 
nanotechnology R&D in China over the past decade has paid off to a certain degree, as China has 
produced the second-largest number of scientific publications in the world since 2003, trailing 
only the US. In this study, we estimated a patent production function on the basis of the 
nanotechnology patent applications submitted to China’s Intellectual Property Office during 
1998–2008, to confirm a hypothesis that nanotechnology innovation in China has so far been 
promoted primarily by public universities and research institutions, not by industry. Indigenous 
Chinese companies have remained weak in patenting activities. This finding reveals that, in the 
early stage of technological development, a developing country such as China is able, through 
large-scale public R&D investment, to engage actively in research related to emerging 
technologies and contribute new knowledge and technology to the international scientific 
community. However, unlike their counterparts in developed economies, indigenous companies 
in developing countries are handicapped by their weak R&D capabilities and their loose 
connections with university and research institutions. They may have difficulty in benefiting from 
R&D activities, which are largely concentrated in the public sector, at least in the short run. 
Public R&D investment is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for enabling 
developing countries to promote emerging technologies. The capabilities of indigenous 
companies, policies promoting competitiveness, regulatory frameworks, the venture capital 
industry, intellectual property rights regimes, and corporate practice all play roles. The take-off of 
indigenous companies in the fields of emerging technologies demands more nuanced policies to 
facilitate spillover from public R&D and synergy between the academy and industry. That is the 
challenge for industrial policy in developing countries.  
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Table 1: Nanotechnology patent applications filed in the Chinese Intellectual Property Office 
(1985–2008, Percentage) 
Applicant From domestic organizations 
From foreign 
organizations 
University 43.28 5.85 
Research institutions 13.28 3.95 
Industry 18.00 83.73 
Individual 21.46 2.57 
University-Research institutions 0.25 0.17 
University-Industry 2.97 1.85 
Research Institution-Industry 0.34 0.83 
University-Research institution-
industry 0.02 0.02 
University-Individual 0.14 0.04 
Research institution-Individual 0.03 0.02 
Industry-Individual 0.24 0.96 
Total 100 100 
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Table 2: Nanotechnology patent production function (all explanatory variables are transformed into logarithm values) 
 Dependent variable: Number of nanotechnology patent applications 
Negative 
Binomial model, 
fixed effects 
Negative Binomial 
model, random 
effects 
Poisson model, fixed 
effects, robust standard 
errors obtained by 
xtpqml 
Poisson model, fixed 
effects, robust standard 
errors obtained by 
bootstrap 
Poisson model, random 
effects, robust standard 
errors obtained by 
bootstrap 
Number of scientists and engineers 
in universities engaged in S&T 
activities (natural science 
fields) 
.14(.12) .23(.12)* .42(.32) .42(.33) .46(.32) 
Number of scientists and engineers 
in research institutions 
engaged in S&T activities 
(natural science fields)  
-1.3(.12)*** -1.1(.12)*** -1.9(.32)*** -1.9(.36)*** -1.8(.37)*** 
Number of scientists and engineers 
in large or medium enterprises 
engaged in S&T activities  
.07(.10)* .011(.095) .076(.25) .076(.29) .033(.28) 
Number of invention patents .58(.090)*** .55(.086)*** .49(.14)*** .49(.16)*** .48(.15)*** 
Number of Web of Science 
nanotechnology publications .69(.074)*** .65(.070)*** .52(.12)*** .52(.14)*** .54(.14)*** 
Transaction value of the 
technology transfer contracts 
involving organizations in 
provinces as recipients  
-.061(.075) -.056(.074) -.083(.10) -.083(.12) -.088(.12) 
Accumulated foreign direct 
investment (FDI stock) -.40(.11)*** -.31(.10)*** -.25(.14)* -.25(.15) -.26(.15)* 
Revenue of high-tech sectors .12(.11) .15(.10) .50(.26)** .50(.29)* .50(.28)* 
      
Number of observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Number of groups 30 30 30 30 30 
Note: The data between the parentheses are standard deviations. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 
10% level.  
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Table 3: Robustness check (All explanatory variables are transformed into logarithm values) 
 Dependent variable: Number of nanotechnology patent applications 
Negative Binomial 
model, fixed 
effects 
Poisson model, fixed 
effects, robust 
standard errors 
obtained by 
bootstrap 
 Negative Binomial 
model, fixed 
effects 
Poisson model, fixed 
effects, robust standard 
errors obtained by 
bootstrap 
R&D expenditure of universities 
(natural science fields)  .25(.095)*** .11(.17)  - - 
Number of scientists and engineers in 
research institutions engaged in 
S&T activities (natural science 
fields)  
-1.2(.11)*** -1.8(.25)***  - - 
Number of patent applications by large 
or medium enterprises  -.0039(.070) .0033(.13)  - - 
Gross R&D expenditure - -  .36(.16)** .32(.32) 
Number of invention patents .61(.10)*** .49(.19)***  .68(.099)*** .27(.11)** 
Number of Web of Science 
nanotechnology publications .55(.092)*** .46(.18)***  .37(.091)*** .55(.23)** 
Transaction value of the technology 
transfer contracts involving 
organizations in provinces as 
recipients and transferors 
-.066(.052) -.060(.11)  -.29(.090)*** -.16(.15) 
Accumulated foreign direct investment 
(FDI stock) -.36(.11)*** -.24(.16)  -.32(.12)** -.57(.23)** 
Revenue of high-tech sectors .063(.11) .46(.27)*  -.22(.13)* .35(.28) 
      
Number of observations 330 330  330 330 
Number of groups 30 30  30 30 
Note: The data between the parentheses are standard deviations. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 
10% level. 
  
Tabl
App
Prov
Beij
Guang
Jian
Shan
Zhej
Nati
tot
Sour
Note
1. Th
activ
are s
Figu
Data
calcu
e 4: Geogra
lication and 
inces 
Num
or 
n
(perc
ing 
dong 
gsu 
ghai 
iang 
onal 
al 
ce: Authors’ 
: 
e listed nano
ities related t
ourced from t
re 1: The W
 source: MER
lation. 
phical Mism
Commercial
ber of departm
institutions w
more than 50
anotechnolog
publications 
entage of nat
total) 
58 (22%) 
5 (2%) 
16 (6%) 
37 (14%) 
6 (2%) 
261 (100%) 
own calculatio
technology co
o the technolo
he China Info
orld’s 10 M
IT Database 
atch of Chin
ization Hots
ents 
ith 
 
y 
ional 
nan
appl
the 
(per
or
n. 
mpanies are l
gy in their an
bank databas
ost Prolific C
of Worldwide
a’s Nanotec
pots 
Number of
otechnology 
ications subm
Chinese Intell
Property Offi
centage of do
ganizations’ t
5254 (21%)
2094 (8%)
1973 (8%)
4163 (17%)
1585 (6%)
24885 (100%
isted firms th
nual reports. 
e.  
ountries in 
 Nanotechnol
hnology Ac
 
patent 
itted to 
ectual 
ce 
mestic 
otal) 
N
n
 
 
 
 
 
) 
at have declar
Annual repor
the Nanotech
ogy Scientifi
ademic Rese
umber of list
anotechnolog
companies 
(percentage o
national total
10 (6%) 
19 (12%) 
15 (10%) 
19 (12%) 
15 (10%) 
157 (100%)
ed that they e
ts of the Chin
nology Fiel
c Publications
arch Center
ed 
y 
f 
) 
Num
gener
com
(perce
nation
135
240 
129
159
143
1751 
ngage in bus
ese listed com
d: 1998–200
. Authors’ ow
 
32 
s, Patent 
ber of 
al listed 
panies 
ntage of 
al total) 
 (8%) 
(14%) 
 (7%) 
 (9%) 
 (8%) 
(100%) 
iness 
panies 
8 
 
n 
  
Figu
1998
 
Data
Note
nano
Figu
2005
Sour
 
re 2: The To
–2007  
 source: PAT
: Nanotechno
technology Y
re 3: Estima
–2007 
ce: Lux Rese
p 10 Countr
STAT databa
logy patents a
01N classific
ted Governm
arch (2008). 
ies and Chin
se (Septembe
re defined as
ation. 
ent and Co
a (13th) in t
r 2009 version
 such in accor
rporate Nano
erms of Nan
). Authors’ o
dance with th
technology 
otechnology
wn calculatio
e European P
Funding (PP
 Patent App
 
n. 
atent Office’s
P US$ Mill
 
 
33 
lications: 
 
ion), 
  
Figur
 
       
i The
Nano
Scien
Insti
strat
robu
ii Th
beca
inter
exam
class
beca
relat
ident
beca
Y01N
the Y
iii So
Wu (
publ
23rd
univ
score
publ
size 
the C
able 
iv Th
Inve
searc
incre
subs
paten
v The
This
large
2009
e 4: Share of N
                   
 analysis of s
technology S
ce. The searc
tute of Techn
egy and other
st. 
e version of th
use it include
national comp
iner at the Eu
ification is a 
use the exami
ed. In contras
ified by a key
use it is a buz
 classificatio
01N classific
 far we have p
2010) develo
ications. Chin
 by 2002 but 
ersities score 
s. It is well k
ication. In add
and extent of 
hina Patent A
to construct a
ere are three t
ntion patent a
h of prior art 
mental techn
tantive exami
ts are protect
 share of indi
 is much high
 share of pate
, 25 percent o
anotechnology
                    
cientific publ
cientific Pub
h strategy us
ology and des
 popular strate
e PATSTAT
s information
arisons. The 
ropean Paten
more rigorous
ners ensure th
t, many applic
word search 
zword. There
n than throug
ation is provi
resented only
ped a citation
a was ranked
dropped to 27
much higher 
nown, howev
ition, citation
a relevant net
bstract Datab
n indicator to
ypes of paten
pplications ar
before granti
ological impr
nation proces
ed for only 10
viduals amon
er than the sh
nts being app
f all domestic
 Patent Applica
       
ications in thi
lications. It is
ed to define n
cribed in Port
gies and foun
 database is th
 regarding wo
classification
t Office cons
 way of ident
at patent app
ations with n
are not directl
fore, we may 
h a keyword 
ded by Scheu
 counts of na
 score to mea
 35th in the w
th in 2006, w
when ranked 
er, that citatio
 is affected b
work of scho
ase does not 
 measure the 
ts in the Chin
e subject to su
ng invention p
ovements, are
s. Invention p
 years. 
g domestic ap
are of individ
lied for by in
 invention pa
tions from Eac
s article is bas
 composed of
anotechnolog
er et al. (2008
d that the ana
at of Septemb
rldwide paten
 code Y01N i
iders it to be r
ifying nanote
lications with
anotechnolog
y related to n
identify fewe
search. A disc
 et al. (2006)
notechnology
sure the impa
orld by citatio
ell behind the
by number of
n is only one
y multiple fac
lars and the op
provide infor
quality of Chi
ese patent sys
bstantive exa
atents. Utility
 granted on a 
atents are pro
plicants for C
uals among fo
dividuals is ch
tents were ap
h Two-digit In
ed on the ME
 scientific pub
y publication
). Huang et a
lytical result
er, 2009. We
t applications
s attached to a
elated to nano
chnology pate
 the Y01N cla
y in the title o
anotechnolog
r nanotechnol
ussion of this
. 
 publications 
ct or quality o
n score in 19
 most advanc
 nanotechnolo
 proxy among
tors other tha
enness of a n
mation regard
nese nanotech
tem: inventio
mination. Pa
 model paten
registration b
tected for 20 
hinese nanot
reign applica
aracteristics 
plied for by in
dustry 
RIT Databas
lications inde
s was develop
l. (2011) com
s obtained by 
 used the PAT
 and provides
 patent applic
technology. U
nts than usin
ssification ar
r abstracts w
y. Applicants
ogy-related p
 issue and de
and patent ap
f Chinese nan
98. Its rankin
ed countries. 
gy publicatio
 others to ind
n quality of p
ational innov
ing patent cit
nology paten
ns, utility mo
tent examiner
ts, which usu
asis and need
years. Howev
echnology pa
nts, which is 
of patenting a
dividuals.  
e of Worldwi
xed by the W
ed by the Geo
pared this sea
this strategy a
STAT datab
 a level groun
ation when th
sing the Y0
g a keyword s
e nanotechno
hich would be
 use the term 
atents through
tailed introdu
plications. Hu
otechnology 
g had improv
Most Chinese
ns than by cit
icate the qual
ublication, su
ation system.
ations, we we
ts through cit
dels and desig
s need to cond
ally represent
 not go throug
er, utility mo
tents is 21.5 p
2.6 percent. S
ctivities in Ch
 
34 
 
de 
eb of 
rgia 
rch 
re 
ase here 
d for 
e patent 
1N 
earch, 
logy-
 
just 
 the 
ction of 
ang and 
ed to 
 
ation 
ity of a 
ch as the 
 Because 
re not 
ations. 
ns. 
uct a 
 
h a 
del 
ercent. 
uch a 
ina. In 
 
 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
vi We used the Stata user-written program xtpqml to obtain the robust standard errors of the fixed-effects 
Poisson model, as suggested by Wooldridge (1999). 
vii An exposition of the Poisson and Negative Binomial panel model is provided in Stata (2007). 
viii Analysis of nanotechnology-related business activities is performed only on listed companies. There is 
no statistical information available regarding nanotechnology start-ups or small or medium enterprises in 
China, although they are considered to be important in commercializing new technologies as well.  
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